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  n August 19, 2014, a Chinese Su-27 fighter conducted a dangerous in-
tercept of a U.S. Navy P-8 patrol aircraft conducting routine surveillance 
135 miles east of Hainan Island. Reminiscent of the 2001 EP-3 incident, 
the Chinese fighter made several passes under and alongside the P-8 before 
doing a barrel roll over top of the U.S. plane and flying within 20–30 feet 
of the Poseidon aircraft. This incident was the fourth “close intercept” by 
Chinese fighters operating out of Hainan Island since March, and has once 
again raised the issue of the legality of conducting surveillance operations 
in and over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) without coastal State no-
tice or consent.1   
All nations have an absolute right under international law to conduct 
military activities beyond the territorial sea of another nation. The United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)2 created a new 
zone—the 200 nautical mile (nm) exclusive economic zone (EEZ)—that 
comprises 38 percent of the world’s oceans, which were previously consid-
ered high seas. The zone was created for the sole purpose of granting 
coastal States greater control over the living and non-living resources adja-
cent to their coasts.3 
Efforts by a handful of nations to expand coastal State authority in the 
EEZ to include residual competencies and rights in the zone were rejected 
by a majority of the States participating in the UNCLOS negotiations.4 
Most nations agreed with the position advocated by the major maritime 
powers, that “[m]ilitary operations, exercises and activities have always 
been regarded as internationally lawful uses of the sea. The right to conduct 
such activities will continue to be enjoyed by all States in the exclusive eco-
                                                                                                                      
1. Robert Burns and Lolita C. Baldor, Pentagon Cites “Dangerous” Chinese Jet Intercept, 
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 22, 2014), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/pentagon-cites-
dangerous-chinese-jet-intercept.  
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part V, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
3. II UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMEN-
TARY, 491–821 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne, eds., 1993) [hereinafter VIRGINIA 
COMMENTARY II]. 












nomic zone.”5 In the end, the Conference negotiators finally agreed on Ar-
ticles 55, 56, 58 and 86, all of which accommodate the various competing 
interests of coastal States and user States in the EEZ without diminishing 
freedom of navigation and other internationally lawful uses of the sea. 
Dissatisfied with the outcome of the negotiations, however, a few na-
tions have sought to unilaterally expand their control in the EEZ, particu-
larly by imposing restrictions on military operations and other lawful activi-
ties. These efforts impinge on traditional uses of the oceans by other States 
and are inconsistent with international law and State practice. 
This paper examines the legal bases for conducting military activities in 
the EEZ. It then reviews some of the more prominent arguments used by 
States that purport to regulate such activities in the EEZ. The paper con-
cludes that the right to engage in military activities in the EEZ is consistent 
with international law, both customary and conventional, as well as State 
practice.  
 
 MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE II.
 
Within the EEZ, the coastal State enjoys sovereign rights for the purpose 
of “exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing” living and non-living 
natural resources, as well as jurisdiction over most off-shore installations 
and structures, marine scientific research, and the protection and preserva-
tion of the marine environment.6 Coastal States do not, however, exercise 
sovereignty over the EEZ. The term “sovereign rights” in Article 56 was 
deliberately chosen to clearly distinguish between coastal State resource 
rights and other limited jurisdiction in the EEZ, and coastal State authority 
                                                                                                                      
5. 17 THIRD UN CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, PLENARY MEETINGS, OF-
FICIAL RECORDS, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/37 and ADD.1–2, 244 (1973–1982) [here-
inafter OFFICIAL RECORDS VOL 17]. 
6. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 56. However, with regard to environmental jurisdic-
tion, there is no requirement that military or other government non-commercial vessels 
and military or other State aircraft comply with coastal State environmental laws and regu-
lations. Article 236 exempts such vessels and aircraft from compliance (“The provisions of 
this Convention regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment do 
not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a 
State and used, for the time being, only on government non-commercial service. However, 
each State shall ensure, by the adoption of appropriate measures not impairing operations 
or operational capabilities of such vessels or aircraft owned or operated by it, that such 
vessels or aircraft act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, with 













in the territorial sea where coastal States enjoy a much broader and more 
comprehensive right of “sovereignty.”7 This conclusion is confirmed by 
Article 89, which provides that “no State may validly purport to subject any 
part of the high seas to its sovereignty.” Article 89 applies to the EEZ pur-
suant to Article 58(2).8 
On the other hand, within the EEZ, all States enjoy high seas freedoms 
of “navigation and overflight . . . laying of submarine cables and pipelines, 
and other internationally lawful uses of the seas related to those freedoms, 
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine 
cables and pipelines, and [which are] compatible with the other provisions 
of the Convention.”9 These “other internationally lawful uses of the seas” 
may be undertaken without coastal State notice or consent and include a 
broad range of military activities such as: intelligence, surveillance and re-
connaissance (ISR) operations; military marine data collection and naval 
oceanographic surveys; war games and military exercises; bunkering and 
underway replenishment; testing and use of weapons; aircraft carrier flight 
operations and submarine operations; acoustic and sonar operations; naval 
control and protection of shipping; establishment and maintenance of mili-
tary-related artificial installations; ballistic missile defense operations and 
ballistic missile test support; maritime interdiction operations (e.g., visit, 
board, search and seizure); conventional and ballistic missile testing; bellig-
erent rights in naval warfare (e.g., right of visit and search); strategic arms 
control verification; maritime security operations (e.g., counter-terrorism 
and counter-proliferation); and sea control. 
States may also conduct a number of non-resource-related maritime 
law enforcement activities in foreign EEZs without coastal State consent 
pursuant to Article 58(2), which provides that “Articles 88 to 115 and other 
pertinent rules of international law apply to the EEZ in so far as they are 
not incompatible . . .” with Part V. These constabulary operations include 
actions taken to counter the slave trade (Article 99) and repress piracy (Ar-
ticles 100–107), suppression of unauthorized broadcasting (Article 109), 
suppression of narcotics trafficking (Articles 108), the exercise of the 
peacetime right of approach and visit (Article 110), the duty to render assis-
                                                                                                                      
7. VIRGINIA COMMENTARY II, supra note 3, at 531–44. See also JAMES KRASKA & 
RAUL PEDROZO, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY LAW 233 (2013). 
8. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 58(2) provides that “Articles 88 to 115 and other perti-
nent rules of international law apply to the EEZ in so far as they are not incompatible . . .” 
with Part V. 












tance (Article 98), and the right of hot pursuit (Article 111). Article 86 of 
the Convention confirms this broad interpretation.  
During the first three sessions of the negotiations, there was little 
agreement on how to define the high seas in Article 86. By the fourth ses-
sion, however, efforts began to focus on “ensuring that the regime of the 
high seas would apply in the EEZ to the extent it was not incompatible 
with Part V.”10As indicated by the Chairman of the Second Committee: 
 
There could be little debate as to which of the provisions . . . on the high 
seas apply in the EEZ . . . . In simple terms, the rights as to resources be-
long to the coastal State and, in so far as such rights are not infringed, all 
other States enjoy the freedoms of navigation and communication.11 
 
Similarly, the President of the Conference Ambassador Tommy Koh indi-
cated at the opening of the fifth session that  
 
the special character of . . . [the EEZ] calls for a clear distinction to be 
drawn between the rights of the coastal State and the rights of the inter-
national community in the zone. A satisfactory solution must ensure that 
the sovereign rights and jurisdiction accorded to the coastal State [in the 
EEZ] are compatible with well-established and long recognized rights of 
communication and navigation.12 
 
The final text of Article 86 recognizes that the EEZ is a new regime, 
while at the same time retaining the distinction that had previously existed 
between the high seas and the territorial sea.13 Although the first sentence 
of the article establishes that the EEZ is sui generis, and that certain re-
source-related high seas freedoms (e.g., living and non-living resource ex-
ploitation and marine scientific research) do not apply in the EEZ, the sec-
ond sentence makes clear that nothing in the article abridges the high seas 
“freedoms enjoyed by all States in the EEZ in accordance with Article 
58.”14 
                                                                                                                      
10. Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Responding to Ms. Zhang’s Talking Points on the EEZ, 10 CHI-
NESE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 207–23, ¶ 16 (2011). See also III UNITED NA-
TIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY, 63–64 (Satya N. 
Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne, eds., 1995) [hereinafter VIRGINIA COMMENTARY III]. 
11. VIRGINIA COMMENTARY III, supra note 10, at 64. 
12. Id. at 65. 
13. Id. at 69. 













It is also important to recognize that UNCLOS does place some re-
straints on military activities at sea. However, none of these limitations ap-
ply in the EEZ. Article 19 of the Convention restricts certain military activ-
ities in foreign territorial seas for ships engaged in innocent passage, such 
as threat or use of force, use of weapons, intelligence gathering, acts of 
propaganda, launching and landing of aircraft and other military devices, 
military surveys and intentionally interfering with communication sys-
tems.15 Article 52 applies the same limitations to archipelagic waters. Sub-
marines and other underwater vehicles engaged in innocent passage in for-
eign territorial seas and archipelagic waters must navigate on the surface 
and show their flag.16 Articles 39 and 54 prohibit the threat or use of force 
when ships are engaged in transit passage or Archipelagic Sea Lanes Pas-
sage (ASLP), and Articles 40 and 54 prohibit survey activities for ships en-
gaged in transit passage or ASLP. Similar restrictions are not found in Part 
V of UNCLOS and therefore do not apply to warships, military aircraft 
and other sovereign immune ships and aircraft operating in or over the 
EEZ.  
UNCLOS also makes clear that coastal States lack competence to regu-
late military activities, such as sensitive reconnaissance operations (SRO), in 
the airspace above the EEZ, particularly when those activities do not have 
an impact on the water column or seabed of the EEZ. Articles 2 and 49 of 
the Convention provide that the airspace above the territorial sea and ar-
chipelagic waters is national airspace, subject to coastal/archipelagic State 
sovereignty (contingent on the right of ASLP). The airspace above the 
                                                                                                                      
15. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 19(2) provides, in part, that:  
 
Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activi-
ties: 
 (a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense or security of 
the coastal State; 
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security of the coastal State; 
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; 
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;  
. . . . 
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; 
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities 
or installations of the coastal State … 
  












EEZ is considered international airspace and, like the high seas, is not sub-
ject to coastal State sovereignty. 
Activities in international airspace are regulated by the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation of 1944 (Chicago Convention).17 Like UN-
CLOS, Article 1 of the Chicago Convention recognizes that the coastal 
State “has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its 
territory.” “Territory” is defined in Article 2 as “the land areas and territo-
rial waters adjacent thereto.” A “State may, for reasons of military necessity 
or public safety, restrict or prohibit uniformly the aircraft of other States 
from flying over certain areas of its territory . . . .”18 Similarly, Article 9(b) 
allows a “State . . .  in exceptional circumstances or during a period of 
emergency, or in the interest of public safety, and with immediate effect, 
temporarily to restrict or prohibit flying over the whole or any part of its 
territory . . . . ” But in both of these instances, the restrictions only apply to 
national, not international, airspace. 
Moreover, Article 3 exempts State aircraft (including military aircraft) 
from the rules of the Chicago Convention, including observance of Flight 
Information Regions (FIRs), except that State aircraft may not fly over the 
territory of another State without the consent of that State. The only re-
quirement is that State aircraft operate with “due regard for the safety of 
navigation of civil aircraft.”19   
Thus, neither UNCLOS nor the Chicago Convention grants coastal 
States any authority over military aircraft operating in international airspace 
beyond the 12 nm limit. On the contrary, Article 56 of UNCLOS specifi-
cally limits coastal State sovereign rights in the EEZ to the seabed, its sub-
soil and the waters superjacent to the seabed, with one exception—the 
coastal State also has exclusive rights over the production of energy from 
the winds. Similarly, the Chicago Convention only limits military activities 
                                                                                                                      
17. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, Dec. 
7, 1944 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].   
18. Id., art. 9(a). 
19. Id., art. 3 provides that:  
 
a. This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and shall not be applicable to 
state aircraft. 
b. Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to be state air-
craft. 
c. No state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State or 
land thereon without authorization special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance 
with the terms thereof. 
d. The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that 














in national airspace and exempts State aircraft from compliance with the 
Convention’s provisions applicable in international airspace. Efforts by 
Brazil to designate the airspace above the EEZ as national airspace at a 
meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) were re-
jected by the ICAO Legal Committee, calling the idea as “flagrantly con-
tradicting the relevant provisions of UNCLOS which equate the EEZ . . . 
with the high seas as regards freedom of overflight.”20 In short, nothing in 
UNCLOS or the Chicago Convention provides a legal basis for regulating 
military activities in international airspace above the EEZ. 
 
  COASTAL STATE RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE EEZ  III.
 
Eighteen States purport to regulate or prohibit foreign military activities in 
the EEZ. These States include: Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma (Myanmar), 
Cape Verde, China, India, Indonesia,21 Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, 
Mauritius, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines,22 Portugal, Thailand, and 
Uruguay.23 Additionally, even though Article 3 of the Convention limits the 
breadth of the territorial sea to 12 nm, seven coastal States—Benin (200 
nm), the Congo (200 nm), Ecuador (200 nm), Liberia (200 nm), Peru (200 
nm), Somalia (200 nm) and Togo (30 nm)—claim a territorial sea in excess 
of 12 nm that also purports to deny or restrict foreign-flagged military ac-
tivities.24 In addition, five nations claim security jurisdiction in their 24 nm 
                                                                                                                      
20. BARBARA KWIATKOWSKA, THE 200 MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE 
NEW LAW OF THE SEA 203 (1989). 
21. Indonesia has not enacted domestic regulations restricting military activities in 
their EEZs, but has on occasion objected to foreign military activities in the zone. For 
example, Indonesia joined Malaysia at a meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 
Manila in 2007 in objecting to proposed ASEAN military exercises in their respective 
EEZs. Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Military Activities In and Over the Exclusive Economic Zone, in 
FREEDOM OF THE SEAS, PASSAGE RIGHTS, AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVEN-
TION 235, 237 (Myron H. Nordquist, Tommy T. B. Koh, & John Norton Moore, eds. 
2009). See also Department of Defense, Maritime Claims Reference Manual (MCRM), De-
partment of Defense Instruction 2005.1–M, June 2008 [hereinafter MCRM], available at 
http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/code_10_mcrm.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2014). 
22. Similarly, the Philippines has not enacted national regulations that restricts military 
activities in their EEZs, but has on a few occasions objected to foreign military activities 
in their EEZ. See also MCRM, supra note 21.  
23. Id. 
24. Id. See also, JAMES KRASKA, MARITIME POWER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: EXPE-












contiguous zone: Cambodia, China, Sudan, Syria, and Vietnam.25 Of the 30 
States that purport to restrict or regulate military activities seaward of the 
territorial sea, only China,26 North Korea27 and Peru28 have demonstrated a 
willingness to use force in pursuit of their excessive EEZ claims.  
                                                                                                                      
25. MCRM, supra note 21. 
26. China has been the most active in challenging U.S. military ships and aircraft op-
erating within and over its EEZ. Although Chinese interference occurs on a routine basis, 
the most notable incidents that received widespread media coverage include:  
(1) On March 23, 2001, USNS Bowditch (T-AGS-62) was conducting a routine military 
hydrographic survey in China’s claimed EEZ in the Yellow Sea when she was aggressively 
confronted by a PLA(N) frigate and ordered to leave the area. Raul Pedrozo, Close Encoun-
ters at Sea: The USNS IMPECCABLE Incident, 62 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW (2009).  
(2) On April 1, 2001, two Chinese F-8s approached a U.S. EP-3 surveillance plane 
that was conducting a routine reconnaissance flight about 70 miles southeast of Hainan 
Island. One of the F-8s collided with the U.S. aircraft after it made several close approach-
es to the EP-3. The EP-3 was severely damaged and was forced to make an emergency 
landing at the Chinese military airfield in Hainan. The F-8 was chopped in half and the 
Chinese pilot was never found. The U.S. aircrew was held captive for two weeks and the 
plane was not returned until July 2001. Id.  
(3) On March 8, 2009, five Chinese ships (a PLA(N) intelligence ship, a Fisheries Law 
Enforcement Command (FLEC) patrol vessel, a State Oceanic Administration (SOA) 
patrol vessel and 2 small PRC cargo ships) surrounded and harassed the USNS Impeccable 
(T-AGOS-23) while she was conducting routine surveillance operations in the South Chi-
na Sea approximately 75 miles southeast of Hainan Island. The civilian cargo ships, acting 
as proxies for the PLA(N), approached within 25 meters of the Impeccable, forcing her to 
make an emergency all-stop to avoid a collision. Id.  
(4) On March 4–5, 2009/May 5, 2009, USNS Victorious (T-AGOS-19) was conducting 
routine surveillance operations in the Yellow Sea when it was illuminated with a high-
intensity spotlight by a FLEC patrol vessel 120 nm off the Chinese coast. The next day a 
Chinese Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft conducted 12 fly-bys of Victorious at an altitude 
of about 400 feet and a range of 500 yards. Then on May 5, 2009, Victorious was harassed 
by two Chinese fishing vessels that approached within 30 meters of the U.S. surveillance 
ship. The fishing boats departed when a PLA(N) warship (WAGOR 17) arrived on scene. 
KRASKA & PEDROZO, supra note 7, at 311.  
(5) On July–November 2010, China objected to a series of planned U.S.-South Kore-
an military exercises in the Yellow Sea indicating that deploying the USS George Washington 
(CVN 73) to the Yellow Sea would be provocative and a threat to Chinese national securi-
ty. Id.  
(6) On June 29, 2011, China warned the United States to stop conducting Sensitive 
Reconnaissance Operations (SRO) near the Chinese coast because they violate PRC sov-
ereignty and security. The warning came after two Su-27 fighters attempted to intercept a 
U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft operating over the Taiwan Strait. Kenneth Allen & Jana 














                                                                                                                      
(7) On July 3, 2013, USNS Impeccable was queried by a China Maritime Surveillance 
(CMS) patrol vessel 100 nm off the Chinese coast in the East China Sea and instructed to 
discontinue its surveillance operation. Bill Gertz, Chinese Naval Vessel Tries to Force U.S. 
Warship to Stop in International Waters, THE WASHINGTON FREE BEACON (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/chinese-naval-vessel-tries-to-force-u-s-warship-
to-stop-in-international-waters/.  
(8) On December 5, 2013, USS Cowpens (CG-63) was monitoring a naval exercise in 
the South China Sea when it was ordered to leave the exercise area. When the U.S. war-
ship refused to comply, a PLA(N) Amphibious Dock Ship crossed Cowpens’ bow at 100 
meters and came to a full stop, forcing the U.S. cruiser to take evasive action to avoid a 
collision. China justified its actions claiming that the Cowpens had entered the 45 kilometer 
inner defensive layer of the Liaoning carrier battle group. Id.  
(9) On August 19, 2014, a Chinese Su-27 fighter conducted a dangerous intercept of a 
U.S. Navy P-8 patrol aircraft conducting routine surveillance 135 miles east of Hainan 
Island, which was fully detailed at the beginning of this article. Burns & Baldor, supra note 
1.  
(10) On August 29, 2014, China once again warned the United States to stop its SRO 
flights near Chinese territory, claiming that the surveillance activities undermine China's 
security interests and could lead to “undesirable incidents.” Sophie Brown, Stop Spy Flights, 
China Warns the U.S., CNN (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/29/world 
/asia/china-us-spy-flights/. 
27. On January 23, 1968, five North Korean warships—three P4 torpedo boats and 
two subchasers—attacked the USS Pueblo (AGER-2) on the high seas, 15.8 miles off Yo 
Do Island. The U.S. surveillance ship was overtly collecting intelligence to gauge Soviet 
and North Korean reactions to the operation. The Pueblo was subsequently boarded and 
escorted back to North Korea, where the crew was held captive for 335 days. The U.S. 
ship remains in the hands of North Korea. Harry Iredale, The Pueblo Incident, USS PUEBLO 
(AGER-2), available at http://www.usspueblo.org/Pueblo_Incident/January_23.html (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2014) (based on personal memory and from LLOYD BUCHER, BUCHER: 
MY STORY (1970)).  
28. On April 25, 1992, Peruvian fighters attacked a U.S. C-130 aircraft that was con-
ducting a routine counterdrug surveillance mission in international airspace off the Peruvi-
an coast. The U.S. made an emergency landing at a small airstrip in Talara, Peru, near the 
border with Ecuador. Peruvian authorities justified their action by alleging that the U.S. 
aircraft failed to respond to several attempts to establish visual and radio warnings by the 
two fighter jets. One crewmember was killed; two were injured. Dale Cheney, Freedom of 
Navigation, THE MOBILITY FORUM 30, 33 (July/August 2003); Eric Schmitt, U.S. Officials 
Say Mutual Errors May Have Led to Incident in Peru, NEW YORK TIMES (Apr. 27, 1992), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/27/world/us-officials-say-mutual-errors-may-have-
led-to-incident-in-peru.html; Nathaniel C. Nash, Peru Jets Attack U.S. Air Transport, NEW 
YORK TIMES (Apr. 26, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/26/world/peru-jets-
attack-us-air-transport.html; Nathaniel C. Nash, U.S. Says a C-130 was Hit by Gunfire From 













Illegal coastal State constraints on foreign military activities in the EEZ 
vary from State-to-State and include: 
 
 restrictions on “non-peaceful uses” of the EEZ without consent, 
such as weapons exercises; 
 limitations on military marine data collection (military surveys) and 
hydrographic surveys without prior notice and/or consent;  
 requirements for prior notice and/or consent for transits by nucle-
ar-powered vessels or ships carrying hazardous and dangerous 
goods, such as oil, chemicals, noxious liquids, and radioactive mate-
rial;  
 limiting warship transits to innocent passage; 
 prohibitions on ISR operations (intelligence collection) and pho-
tography; 
 requiring warships to place weapons in an inoperative position pri-
or to entering the contiguous zone; 
 restrictions on navigation and overflight through the EEZ; 
 prohibitions on conducting flight operations (launching and recov-
ery of aircraft) in the contiguous zone; 
 requiring submarines to navigate on the surface and show their flag 
in the contiguous zone; 
 requirements for prior permission for warships to enter the contig-
uous zone or EEZ;  
 asserting security jurisdiction in the contiguous zone or EEZ;  
 application of domestic environmental laws and regulations; and 
 requirements that military and other State aircraft file flight plans 
prior to transiting the EEZ. 
 
These excessive claims have no basis in customary international law, State 
practice, UNCLOS or the Chicago Convention, and have been diplomati-
cally protested against and operationally challenged by the United States 
under the U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program. 
 
A. Maritime Scientific Research v. Military Marine Data Collection 
 
As discussed above, coastal States may regulate marine scientific research 
(MSR) in their EEZ. States that purport to limit military marine data collec-













that such operations are akin to MSR and are therefore subject to coastal 
State control.29 That argument is clearly flawed. To the extent that coastal 
State laws purport to regulate hydrographic surveys and military marine 
data collection activities, to include military oceanographic surveys and un-
derwater, surface, and aviation surveillance and reconnaissance missions, 
they are inconsistent with State practice and customary international law, as 
well as the plain language of UNCLOS. 
Although UNCLOS does not define MSR or hydrographic surveys, the 
Convention clearly differentiates between MSR, surveys, and military activi-
ties in various articles. The use of the term “marine scientific research” was 
specifically chosen to distinguish MSR from other types of marine data col-
                                                                                                                      
29. China, for example, has enacted domestic legislation and implementing regula-
tions that prohibit all types of marine data collection—MSR, hydrographic surveys and 
military marine data collection—without Chinese consent. The 1998 Law on the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and Continental Shelf requires China’s approval for foreign MSR in its EEZ.  
Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Conti-
nental Shelf, Order No. 6, art. 8 (promulgated by the 3rd Meeting of the STANDING 
COMM. NINTH NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG., Feb. 26, 1998, effective June 26, 1998) (China) 
[hereinafter 1998 Chinese Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf], 
translation available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONAND TREA-
TIES/PDFFILES/chn_1998_eez_act.pdf. The law’s implementing regulations—
Provisions on the Administration of Foreign-Related Maritime Scientific Research—
similarly require Chinese consent for foreign-related MSR activities in the EEZ. Provi-
sions on the Administration of Foreign-Related Maritime Scientific Research, June 18, 
1996 (promulgated by Decree No.199 of the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China, June 18, 1996) (China). Article 7 of the 2002 Surveying and Mapping Law of the 
People’s Republic of China, however, requires foreign organizations and individuals that 
want to engage in surveying and mapping operations in “sea areas under the jurisdiction” 
of China to obtain the prior approval of competent Chinese authorities. Law of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China on the Surveying and Mapping (promulgated by the 29th Meeting 
of the STANDING COMM. NINTH NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG., Aug. 29, 2002, effective Dec. 1, 
2002). Surveying and mapping are broadly defined in Article 2 to include “surveying, col-
lection and presentation of the shape, size, spatial location and properties of the natural 
geographic factors or the manmade facilities on the surface, as well as the activities for 
processing and providing of the obtained data, information and achievements.” Id. Thus, 
Beijing’s application of the 1998 and 2002 laws appears inconsistent with UNCLOS be-
cause they purport to apply to hydrographic surveys and military marine data collection in 
the EEZ and thus are not solely limited to regulation of foreign MSR. Raul Pedrozo, 
Coastal State Jurisdiction over Marine Data Collection in the Exclusive Economic Zone: U.S. Views, in 
MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE EEZ: A U.S.-CHINA DIALOGUE ON SECURITY AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW IN THE MARITIME COMMONS 23–26 (Peter Dutton, ed. 2010) (No. 7 Chi-
na Maritime Study). See also J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCESSIVE MARI-












lection that are not resource-related, such as hydrographic surveys and mili-
tary oceanographic surveys.30 Article 19(2)(j), for example, prohibits both 
“research or survey activities” for ships engaged in innocent passage. Arti-
cle 40 applies a similar restriction to ships engaged in transit passage—
“marine scientific research and hydrographic survey ships may not carry 
out any research or survey activities” without prior authorization of the 
States boarding the strait. The same restrictions apply to ships engaged in 
ASLP (Article 54) and ships transiting archipelagic waters in innocent pas-
sage (Article 52).  
Article 56(1)(b)(ii) and Part XIII, on the other hand, only grant coastal 
States jurisdiction over MSR. Article 87(1)(f), also only refers to “scientific 
research.” Thus, while coastal States may regulate MSR and surveys in the 
territorial sea, archipelagic waters, international straits, and archipelagic sea 
lanes, they may not regulate hydrographic surveys in the other maritime 
zones, including the contiguous zone and the EEZ. Hydrographic surveys 
and other military marine data collection activities remain issues governed 
by high seas freedom of navigation and other internationally lawful uses of 
the sea, and are therefore exempt from coastal State jurisdiction in the con-
tiguous zone and EEZ.31 The distinction between MSR and other forms of 
marine data collection articulated in UNCLOS reflect centuries of State 
practice. 
In order to operate at sea across the full spectrum of operations,32 the 
U.S. Navy, like any other navy, must fully understand the environment in 
which it operates. U.S. naval units have plied the world’s oceans for more 
than 180 years conducting military marine data collection since the De-
partment of Charts and Instruments was first established in 1830.33 Marine 
data and intelligence information is continuously collected seaward of the 
territorial sea by naval ocean surveillance ships and naval oceanographic 
survey ships to ensure safety of navigation, to build oceanographic and me-
teorological profiles, to maintain force protection, and to inform naval 
commanders, theater commanders, and national leaders. Only in the last 
                                                                                                                      
30. UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 19(2)(j), 40, 54, 87(1)(f) & Part XIII.  
31. UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 58, 86 & 87. 
32. The Navy’s six core capabilities are forward presence, deterrence, sea control, 
power projection, maritime security and humanitarian assistance/disaster response. U.S. 
NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, A COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST 
CENTURY SEAPOWER (Oct. 2007), available at http://www.navy.mil/maritime/Maritime 
Strategy.pdf.  














thirty years have these operations come under scrutiny by a handful of 
rogue coastal States. The law, however, is clear—the coastal State’s right to 
regulate MSR does not apply to other separate and distinct activities, such 
as oceanographic surveys and other military data collection efforts, includ-
ing ISR operations. 
 
B. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Operations 
 
Although they were unsuccessful during the UNCLOS negotiations, some 
nations continue to maintain that coastal States retain residual rights in the 
EEZ, including the right to assert security jurisdiction in and over the zone. 
China has been the principal advocate of this position.  
Following the 2001 mid-air collision between a Chinese F-8 fighter and 
an American EP-3 surveillance plane, Washington protested the incident, 
asserting that China had violated its “due regard” obligation under interna-
tional law. Beijing responded that intelligence collection posed a threat to 
China’s national security interests and that U.S. military aircraft therefore 
only had a right of overflight in the EEZ. China has maintained this posi-
tion ever since. For example, on June 29, 2011, China warned the United 
States to stop conducting Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations (SRO) near 
the Chinese coast because they violate PRC sovereignty and security. The 
warning came after two Su-27 fighters attempted to intercept a U.S. U-2 
reconnaissance aircraft operating over the Taiwan Strait.34 More recently, 
on August 29, 2014, China once again warned the United States to stop its 
SRO flights near Chinese territory after Washington protested a dangerous 
intercept of an American P-8 by a Chinese Su-27 fighter.35 Beijing dis-
missed the protest, claiming that U.S. surveillance activities undermine 
China’s security interests and could lead to “undesirable incidents.”36  
China’s position is not supported by State practice or a plain reading of 
UNCLOS, the Chicago Convention and other applicable international in-
struments.  The only place in UNCLOS that address intelligence collection 
is Article 19(2)(c). That article restricts foreign ships transiting the territori-
al sea in innocent passage from engaging in “any act aimed at collecting 
information to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal state.” 
An analogous limitation does not appear in Part V of the Convention re-
garding the EEZ. Similarly, pursuant to Article 3 of the Chicago Conven-
                                                                                                                      
34. Allen & Allen, supra note 26. 
35. Burns & Baldor, supra note 1. 












tion, coastal States may not regulate State aircraft activities seaward of the 
territorial sea (international airspace). Thus, in accordance with a generally 
accepted principle of international law—any act that is not prohibited in 
international law is permitted (the Lotus principle)—States may lawfully 
engage in intelligence collection, oceanographic surveys and other military 
activities in and over the EEZ without coastal State notice or consent.37 
The text of UNCLOS and the Chicago Convention reflect State prac-
tice since 1945. The post-war era saw an increasing number of excessive 
maritime claims, as nations sought to expand coastal State competencies 
beyond the territorial sea. Yet, during the Cold War, warships and military 
aircraft from the Western alliance and the Soviet bloc routinely collected 
intelligence and conducted military surveys in what is today the EEZ. It 
was not uncommon for Soviet surveillance ships (AGI) to sit outside the 
territorial sea and collect intelligence on U.S. and NATO warships and op-
erations at sea. Such surveillance activities were lawful and acceptable to 
the Alliance so long as the AGIs remained outside of the territorial sea and 
complied with the obligations of the 1972 International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS)38 and the 1972 US–USSR 
Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on the High Seas (INCSEA).39 
This practice continues today, as surveillance and survey ships from a 
number of countries, including Australia, China, Japan, NATO, Russia, 
South Africa, and the United Kingdom (to name a few), ply the world’s 
oceans collecting marine data for military use.40  
The U.S. Navy Special Mission Program (SMP) maintains a fleet of 
twenty-five ships that conduct a variety of missions seaward of the territo-
rial sea, including (inter alia) oceanographic surveys, underwater surveil-
                                                                                                                      
37. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7); Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 238 ¶ 20 (July 
8).  
38. Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20, 
1972, 28 UST 3459, TIAS 8587, 1050 U.N.T.S. 17 [hereinafter COLREGS].   
39. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents 
On and Over the High Seas, Dec. 29, 1972, 852 U.N.T.S. 151, as amended by the Proto-
col thereto, May 22, 1973, 24 UST 1063, TIAS No. 7624, and by the 1998 exchange of 
diplomatic notes [hereinafter INCSEA]. 













lance, hydrographic surveys, and missile tracking and acoustic surveys.41 Of 
these twenty-five vessels, six are multipurpose oceanographic survey ships 
that perform acoustic, biological, physical and geophysical surveys to en-
hance the Navy’s information on the marine environment.42 A seventh 
oceanographic survey ship collects data in coastal regions around the world 
that is used to improve technology in undersea warfare, enemy ship detec-
tion and charting the world’s coastlines. The SMP also operates five ocean 
surveillance ships that directly support the Navy by using both passive and 
active low-frequency sonar arrays to detect and track undersea threats. 
These ships additionally provide locating data that promote navigational 
safety of various undersea platforms. Operations by these ships seaward of 
the territorial sea are consistent with international law and long-standing 
State practice. 
Likewise, since the advent of aviation more than one hundred years 
ago, military aircraft have flown countless missions beyond national air-
space, to include ISR operations. These activities were commonplace dur-
ing the Cold War and in most cases occurred without incident or adverse 
political repercussions. Even on those rare occasions when coastal States 
have objected to foreign ISR flights off their coast, normally they have 
done so on the grounds that the aircraft intruded into “national” airspace, 
rather than questioning the legality of intelligence collection generally.43 
The issue of aerial reconnaissance was brought before the UN Security 
Council following a series of incidents involving the United States and the 
Soviet Union. During the deliberations, the Soviet delegation specifically 
rejected the position that a coastal State had the right to interfere with in-
telligence collection activities beyond national airspace.44 The United King-
dom delegations similarly indicated without objection that aerial surveil-
lance directed at a coastal State from international airspace was consistent 
with international law and the UN Charter.45 
                                                                                                                      
41. U.S. Navy Fact File: Oceanographic Survey Ships—T-AGS, available at 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=4500&tid=700&ct=4 (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2014). 
42. These ships use multibeam, wide-angle, precision sonar systems that allow the 
ships to chart wide areas of the ocean floor. 
43. Oliver J. Lissitzyn, The Role of International Law and an Evolving Oceans Law, in ELEC-
TRONIC RECONNAISSANCE FROM THE HIGH SEAS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 566–67, 
574–75, 578–79 (Richard B. Lillich & John Norton Moore eds., 1980) (Vol. 61 U.S. Naval 














State practice since the end of the Cold War has continued to respect 
the distinction between national and international airspace with regard to 
ISR operations. For example, from 2004 to 2014, over fifty Russian aircraft 
have been intercepted in the U.S., Canadian, Japanese, South Korean and 
British ADIZs.46 In each case, the Russian aircraft were intercepted and 
monitored, but were permitted to go on their way when it was determined 
that they would not penetrate the national airspace of the coastal State.47 In 
the one case where force was used—Syrian forces shot down an unarmed 
Turkish RF-4E Phantom reconnaissance aircraft in June 2012—Damascus 
justified its actions claiming that the Turkish spy plane was well within Syr-
                                                                                                                      
46. Bill Gertz, Russian Bombers Fly Within 50 Miles of California Coast, U.S. F-22, F-15 Jets 
Intercept Four Bear H bombers near Alaska, Northern California, THE WASHINGTON FREE BEA-
CON (June 11, 2014), http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russian-bombers-fly-
within-50-miles-of-california-coast/.  
47. (1) Between May 2007 and May 2008, Russian TU-95 Bear bombers conducted a 
number of operational flights off the coasts of Alaska and Canada. U.S. and Canadian 
fighters intercepted and monitored the bombers, but each time the Russian aircraft were 
allowed to continue on their way. Rowan Scarborough, Russian Flights Smack of Cold War, 
THE WASHINGTON TIMES (26 June 2008), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news 
/2008/jun/26/russian-flights-smack-of-cold-war/?page=all.  
(2) In November 2007, British Typhoon fighter jets intercepted a Russian reconnais-
sance aircraft that was detected approaching British airspace. The aircraft was allowed to 
proceed after it was determined that it would not enter British airspace. Matthew Hickley 
& David Williams, RAF Fighter Jets Scrambled to Intercept Russian Bombers, MAIL ONLINE 
(Aug. 22, 2007), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-476751/RAF-fighter-jets-
scrambled-intercept-Russian-bombers.html.  
(3) In March and May of 2008, U.S. F-15 jets intercepted Russian Tu-95 Bear heavy 
bombers off of Alaska. After it was determined that the Bears would not penetrate U.S. 
airspace, they were permitted to complete their mission. Erik Holmes, More Russian Bomb-
ers Flying off Alaska, AIR FORCE TIMES (Apr. 8 2008), http://www.airforcetimes.com 
/article/20080406/NEWS/804060301/More-Russian-bombers-flying-off-Alaska-coast.  
(4) In February 2009, Canadian CF-18 fighters intercepted a Russian Tu-95 Bear 
bomber that was approaching Canadian airspace. When it is determined that the intercept-
ed aircraft was on a training mission, it was allowed to continue on its flight without har-
assment or interference. Russia Denies Plane Approached Canadian Airspace, CANADIAN 
BROADCASTING CORP. NEWS (Feb. 27, 2009), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/russia-
denies-plane-approached-canadian-airspace-1.796007.  
(5) In February 2013, two bombers were intercepted as they circled the U.S. Pacific 
island of Guam, in a rare long-range incursion. Two Bear Hs also were intercepted near 
Alaska on April 28, 2013. A Russian Bear H incursion in Asia took place in in July 2013 
when two Tu-95s were intercepted by Japanese and South Korean jets near the Korean 













ian national airspace when it was engaged.48 The Syrians did not allege that 
ISR operations, in general, were per se illegal. The most recent incident oc-
curred in June 2014 when two Russian strategic bombers were intercepted 
by two U.S. F-15s after the Russian Tu-95 Bear H aircraft came within fifty 
miles of the California coast.49 The Russian aircraft were permitted to con-
tinue on their way after it was determined that they were conducting a 
training mission and would not penetrate U.S. national airspace.50  
Further evidence of State practice can also be found in numerous bilat-
eral incidents at sea agreements that specifically recognize the legitimacy of 
military activities at sea, to include ISR operations. Article III(3) of the US–
USSR INCSEA Agreement provides that “ships engaged in surveillance of 
other ships shall stay at a distance which avoids the risk of collision and 
also shall avoid executing maneuvers embarrassing or endangering the 
ships under surveillance . . . .” Similar language is contained in agreements 
between Russia and the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Greece, Japan and the Republic of Ko-
rea.51 
Despite this abundant evidence of State practice that permits intelli-
gence collection beyond the territorial sea in and over the EEZ, China 
stands alone in its continued harassment and interference of U.S. SMS op-
erations in the EEZ and U.S. SRO flights in international airspace. Without 
question, intelligence collection seaward of the territorial sea is not subject 
to coastal State jurisdiction or control in and over the EEZ. These activities 
are consistent with long-standing State practice and international law, in-
cluding UNCLOS (Articles 56, 58 and 87) and the Chicago Convention 
(Article 3), and are a legitimate exercise of high seas freedoms seaward of 
the territorial sea. If China wishes to intercept and query a foreign warship, 
SMS ship or military aircraft operating off its coast in order to determine its 
intentions, it may do so. However, such intercepts must be carried out in a 
                                                                                                                      
48. Eric Schmitt & Sebnem Arsu, Backed By NATO, Turkey Steps Up Warning To Syria, 
NEW YORK TIMES (June 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/world/middle 
east/turkey-seeks-nato-backing-in-syria-dispute.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
49. The Tu-95 can be equipped with intelligence-gathering sensors and is capable of 
carrying nuclear cruise missiles. Gertz, supra note 46. 
50. A similar incident occurred on July 4, 2012. Id.  
51. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
NAVAL OPERATIONS, ¶¶ 2.8, 2–36 (A.R. Thomas & James C. Duncan eds., 1999) (Vol. 73, 
U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies); David F. Winkler, Soviet Motivations to 
Negotiate INCSEA (Naval Historical Center, Colloquium on Contemporary History Pro-












safe and responsible manner, consistent with the COLREGS and with due 
regard for the rights of foreign ships and aircraft to operate in and over the 
EEZ. 
 
C. “Peaceful Purposes” Provisions 
 
A corollary argument made be some States, including China, is that military 
activities are inconsistent with the peaceful purposes provision of UN-
CLOS.52 Again, this position is not supported by State practice, a plain 
reading of UNCLOS or other applicable international instruments. 
Article 301 of the Convention calls on States to “refrain from any 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independ-
ence of any State . . . .” The language is identical to text in Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter on the prohibition of armed aggression in the relations 
among States.53 UNCLOS, however, makes a clear distinction between 
“threat or use of force” on the one hand, and other military-related activi-
ties, on the other. Article 19(2)(a) repeats the language of Article 301, pro-
hibiting ships in innocent passage from engaging in “any threat or use of 
force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence 
of the coastal State.” The remaining subparagraphs of Article 19(2) restrict 
other military activities in the territorial sea: 
 
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defense 
or security of the coastal State; 
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security of the 
coastal State; 
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; 
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;  
. . . .  
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; 
                                                                                                                      
52. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 301 (providing that “[i]n exercising their rights and 
performing their duties under this Convention, States Parties shall refrain from any threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations.”). 
53. UN Charter Article 2(4) provides that “All Members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 













(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or 
any other facilities or installations of the coastal State . . .  
 
The distinction in Article 19 between “threat or use of force” from other 
types of military activities clearly demonstrates that UNCLOS does not 
automatically equate use of force with these other military acts.  
The “peaceful purposes” language originally was derived from the text 
of UN General Assembly Resolution 2749 (1970), which declared that the 
sea-bed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction was reserved exclusively 
for peaceful purposes.54 A group of developing nations proposed that the 
original version of Article 301 be included in Article 88, which provides 
that “[t]he high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.” That pro-
posal was not adopted, however, and the text was reintroduced separately 
as a new article.55 An effort to include the new Article 301 in the EEZ sec-
tion of the Convention (Part V) was also defeated “by maritime States on 
the ground that security matters should not be considered within the EEZ 
regime.”56 
As the negotiations of the Convention continued, some developing 
States took the position that the text of Articles 88 and 301 would prohibit 
all military activities in the oceans. Ecuador, for example, argued that “the 
use of the ocean space for exclusively peaceful purposes must mean com-
plete demilitarization and the exclusion from it of all military activities.”57 
Maritime States opposed such a strict interpretation of the “peaceful pur-
poses” language, asserting that the test of whether an activity was consid-
ered “peaceful” was determined by the UN Charter and other obligations 
of international law.58  
                                                                                                                      
54. UNGA Res. 2749 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/Res/2749 (Dec. 17, 1970). 
55. VIRGINIA COMMENTARY III, supra note 10, at 90. See also KRASKA & PEDROZO, 
supra note 7, at 305. 
56. DAVID J. ATTARD, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 69 (1991). 
57. VIRGINIA COMMENTARY III, supra note 10, at 88–89. 




The term “peaceful purposes” did not, of course, preclude military activities generally. 
The United States has consistently held that the conduct of military activities for peaceful 
purposes was in full accord with the Charter of the United Nations and with the principles 
of international law. Any specific limitation on military activities would require the negoti-
ation of a detailed arms control agreement. The Conference was not charged with such a 
purpose and was not prepared for such a negotiation. Any attempt to turn the Confer-
ence’s attention to such a complex task would quickly bring to an end current ef-













Most commentators that have addressed this issue agree that 
 
based on various provisions of the Convention . . . it is logical . . . to in-
terpret the peaceful…purposes clauses as prohibiting only those activities 
which are not consistent with the UN Charter. It may be concluded ac-
cordingly that the peaceful purposes . . . clauses in Articles 88 and 301 do 
not prohibit all military activities on the high seas and in EEZs, but only 
those that threaten or use force in a manner inconsistent with the UN 
Charter.59 
 
Thus, the determination of whether an activity is “peaceful” is made under 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.60 Successive U.S. administrations have 
maintained the position that the “peaceful purposes” provisions can only 
be read in conjunction with the general body of international law, including 
Article 2(4) and the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense, 
as reflected in Article 51 of the UN Charter.61 
To accept that all military activities are, by their nature, inconsistent 
with the “peaceful purposes,” would mean that nations could not operate 
military vessels or aircraft, not just in the EEZ, but also the high seas. Such 
a conclusion, however, is at odds with decisions of the UN Security Coun-
                                                                                                                      
Id. at 89. The same text can be found in V THIRD UN CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE 
SEA, 67TH PLENARY MEETING, OFFICIAL RECORDS, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/67, at 
62 (1973–1982). See also, Bernard H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 809, 829–
32 (1984); KRASKA & PEDROZO, supra note 7, at 306–07. 
59. Moritaka Hayashi, Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the EEZ: Definition of 
Key Terms, 29 MARINE POLICY 123–37 (2005). See also Pedrozo, supra note 10, ¶ 27. 
60. KRASKA & PEDROZO, supra note 7, at 304–09. 
61. Id. at 308. In the commentary accompanying the U.S. President’s letter of trans-
mittal of the Convention to the Senate in 1994, President Clinton stated that none of the 
peaceful purposes provisions of the Convention (Articles 88, 141, 143, 147, 155, 240, 242, 
246 and 301) “create new rights or obligations, imposes restraints upon military opera-
tions, or impairs the inherent right of self-defense. . . . More generally, military activities, 
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or any other, provisions of the Convention.” Letter of Transmittal from President Bill 
Clinton, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, S. Treaty Doc. 103–39, 103rd 
Cong., at III and 94 (1994). A similar position was taken by President Bush in his 2004 
letter of transmittal of the Convention to the Senate: “The United States understands that 
nothing in the Convention, including any provisions referring to ‘peaceful uses’ or ‘peace-
ful purposes,’ impairs the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense or rights 
during armed conflict.” United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, S. Exec. Rpt. 













cil, which indicate that “military activities consistent with the principles of 
international law embodied in [Article 2(4) and Article 51 of] the Charter of 
the United Nations . . . are not prohibited by the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea.”62 The International Court of Justice has similarly ruled that na-
val maneuvers conducted by the United States from 1982 to 1985 off the 
coast of Nicaragua during the U.S.-backed counter-revolution against the 
Sandinista government did not constitute a threat or use of force against 
Nicaragua.63  
The Security Council has likewise determined that peacetime intel-
ligence collection is not considered a “threat or use of force against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal 
state . . . in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.” Following the 
shoot down of an American U-2 spy plane near Sverdlovsk in1960, an ef-
fort by the Soviet Union to have a Security Council resolution adopted that 
would have labelled the U-2 flights as “acts of aggression” under the Char-
ter failed by a vote of 7 to 2 (with 2 abstentions), thereby confirming that 
peacetime intelligence collection is consistent with the UN Charter.64 
The San Remo Manual on the Law of Armed Conflicts at Sea similarly rejects 
the interpretation that all military activities are inconsistent with the 
“peaceful purposes” provisions of the Convention. According to the Man-
ual, armed conflict at sea can take place on the high seas, as well as in the 
EEZ of a neutral State.65 The only limitation is that belligerents must “have 
due regard for the [resource] rights and duties of the coastal State” in the 
EEZ.66 
Other multilateral instruments likewise recognize that military activities 
at sea are lawful and do not, per se, constitute a “threat or use of force 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence” of 
other States. The International Maritime Organization (IMO)/International 
Hydrographic Organization (IHO)World-wide Navigational Warning Ser-
vice recognizes that military activities at sea, such as naval exercises and 
missile firings, are lawful uses of the sea, for which “naval area” warnings 
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are to be issued.67 Annex 15 to the Chicago Convention regarding Aero-
nautical Information Services similarly acknowledges the legitimacy of mili-
tary activities in international airspace by providing that military exercises 
that pose hazards to civil aviation are appropriate subjects for notices to 
airmen.68 
 
D. Coastal State Environmental Regulations 
 
Despite the plain language of Article 236 of UNCLOS, some States pur-
port to apply their domestic environmental laws and regulations to limit 
foreign military activities in their EEZ. Article 56 does grant the coastal 
State “jurisdiction . . . with regard to . . . the protection and preservation of 
the marine environment.” It is equally clear in the first sentence of Article 
236, however, that the environmental provisions of the Convention do not 
apply to “any warship, naval auxiliary and other vessels or aircraft owned or 
operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government non-
commercial service.”69 Thus, sovereign immune vessels and aircraft do not 
have a legal obligation to comply with domestic environmental regulations. 
The only requirement is that “each State shall ensure, by the adoption of 
appropriate measures not impairing operations or operational capabilities 
of such vessels or aircraft owned or operated by it, that such vessels or air-
                                                                                                                      
67. IMO/IHO World-wide Navigational Warning Service Document, annex 1, ¶ 
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craft act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable and practicable, 
with this Convention.”70 
The second sentence of Article 236 was carefully worded to preserve 
the principle of sovereign immunity reflected in Article 9571 and Article 
96,72 both of which apply in the EEZ pursuant to Article 58.73 Thus, it is 
the flag State’s responsibility, not the coastal State’s right, to adopt appro-
priate measures that will allow its government vessels to act consistent with 
the environmental provisions of the Convention. Moreover, any measures 
adopted by the flag State shall not impair operations or operational capabil-
ities of the ship or aircraft. Finally, if the flag State can adopt measures that 
do not interfere with the platform’s operational capabilities, then the ship 
or aircraft may act in a manner consistent with the Convention, but only if 
it is reasonable and practicable, based on the circumstances, for the plat-
form to do so. 
Accordingly, it is abundantly clear that sovereign immune ships and 
aircraft do not have a legal obligation to comply or respect coastal State 
environmental laws and regulations. The Convention merely requires that 
sovereign immune ships and aircraft make best efforts to act consistently 
with the Convention, but only as long as such actions are reasonable and 
practicable and do not impair the operations or operational capabilities of 
the platform.74 
China’s application of its domestic laws and regulations provides one 
example of how coastal States overreach with regard to their environmental 
jurisdiction in the EEZ. China claimed a 200 nm EEZ in its 1998 Exclu-
sive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Law.75 Article 3 of the law pro-
vides, inter alia, that China exercises “jurisdiction in relation to . . . protec-
tion and conservation of [the] maritime environment.” Article 10 further 
states that China “has the power to take necessary measures for preventing, 
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eliminating and controlling pollution to [the] marine environment and pro-
tecting and conserving the marine environment . . .” of the EEZ. The 1998 
law does not, however, distinguish between commercial and sovereign im-
mune vessels. Similarly, China’s Marine Environmental Protection Law and 
its implementing regulations purport to apply to all vessels of Chinese or 
foreign registry operating in “sea areas under the jurisdiction” of China.76 
As discussed above, under prevailing international law, China may not im-
pose or enforce domestic environmental laws on sovereign vessels and air-
craft operating in the EEZ. 
Beginning in 2007, China amplified its environmental argument at 
meetings of the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement and 
Defense Policy Talks. In these meetings China indicated that sonar use by 
U.S. SMSs was harming marine mammals and disrupting fish stocks in 
China’s EEZ, and that they could therefore regulate such activities.77 Coin-
cidentally, during this same time period, the U.S. Navy was litigating a 
number of lawsuits filed by environmental groups in U.S. courts, “includ-
ing a 2007 ruling against the U.S. Navy in a lawsuit before the U.S. District 
Court in Southern California that challenged the Navy’s use of mid-
frequency active sonar during military exercises.”78 China continued to ad-
vance this position even after the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the dis-
trict court opinion and ruled in favor of the Navy in 2008, stating that that 
there was no evidence marine mammals were being harmed by the Navy’s 
use of sonar in Southern California.79 
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 NORTH KOREA’S MILITARY ZONE IV.
 
North Korea has one of the most expansive and illegal claims in the EEZ. 
On August 1, 1977, North Korea announced that it was establishing a 
“military zone”—“50 miles from the starting line of the territorial waters in 
the East Sea and to the boundary line of the economic sea zone in the 
West Sea.”80 The zone was purportedly established to safeguard the North 
Korean EEZ and defend the “nation’s interests and sovereignty.”81 Foreign 
military ships and aircraft are prohibited from entering the zone, and “civil-
ian ships and civilian planes (excluding fishing boats) are allowed to navi-
gate or fly only with appropriate prior agreement or approval.”82 Civilian 
ships and aircraft that have been granted access to the zone may not, how-
ever, engage in “acts for military purposes or acts infringing upon the eco-
nomic interests.”83 Taking photographs and collecting marine data is also 
strictly prohibited. 
                                                                                                                      
80. MCRM, supra note 21, North Korea. The proclamation provides: 
 
Demanded by the situation prevailing in our country, the Supreme Command of the Ko-
rean People’s Army establishes the military boundary to reliably safeguard the economic 
sea zone of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and firmly defend militarily the 
nation’s interests and sovereignty of the country.  
The military boundary is up to 50 miles from the starting line of the territorial waters in 
the East Sea and to the boundary line of the economic sea zone in the West Sea.  
In the military boundary (on the sea, in the sea and in the sky) acts of foreigners, foreign 
military vessels, and foreign military planes are prohibited and civilian ships and civilian 
planes (excluding fishing boats) are allowed to navigate or fly only with appropriate prior 
agreement or approval.  
In the military boundary (on the sea, in the sea, and in the sky) civilian vessels and civilian 
planes shall not conduct acts for military purposes or acts infringing upon the economic 
interests.983  
The military zone stretches 50 nm beyond the 12 nm territorial sea in the Sea of Japan on 
the east coast and to the limits of its EEZ in the Yellow Sea (abutting the Chinese EEZ) 
on the west coast.984  
Foreign warships and aircraft are forbidden from entry into the zone, and merchant ships 
and commercial airliners are required to seek permission from North Korea. Additionally, 
foreign ships and aircraft may not take photographs or collect marine data in the North 
Korean EEZ. 
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In effect, North Korea treats the waters and airspace contained within 
the military zone as internal waters and national airspace, respectively. Such 
a claim is clearly inconsistent with UNCLOS, Parts II (territorial sea and 
contiguous zone), III (EEZ), and VII (high seas), as well as the Chicago 
Convention, Articles 1–3 and 9, discussed above. 
 
 CONCLUSION  V.
 
For the foreseeable future, coastal States will continue to make a variety of 
legal arguments to justify interference with foreign-flagged warships and 
military aircraft operating their EEZ. By raising the political and military 
costs of such operations, these States seek to pressure nations to remain 
outside the EEZ. These efforts, however, impinge on traditional uses of 
the EEZ by other States, are inconsistent with international law, and 
should be opposed by all sea-going nations.  
If the position of a handful of nations becomes the international stand-
ard, nearly 38 percent of the world’s oceans that were once considered high 
seas and open to unfettered military use will come under coastal State regu-
lation and control. In the Asia-Pacific, the littoral States could deny military 
access to all of the South China and East China Seas, the Sea of Japan and 
the Yellow Sea, which are home to some of the world’s most strategic sea 
lines of communication. Such a result was not part of the package deal ne-
gotiated at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III) and would never have been agreed to by the major mari-
time powers. 
Rather, the majority of the delegations present at the negotiations 
agreed with the view of the major maritime powers, as expressed by the 
United States at the conclusion of the diplomatic conference: 
 
All States continue to enjoy in the [EEZ] traditional high seas freedoms 
of navigation and overflight and the laying of submarine cables and pipe-
lines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those 
freedoms, which remain qualitatively and quantitatively the same as those 
freedoms when exercised seaward of the zone. Military operations, exer-
cises and activities have always been regarded as internationally lawful us-













joyed by all States in the exclusive economic zone. This is the import of 
Article 58 of the Convention.84 
 
This conclusion is supported by statements made by Ambassador 
Tommy Koh at a conference in Singapore in 2008. Ambassador Koh re-
called,  
 
some coastal states would like the status of the EEZ to approximate the 
legal status of the territorial seas. Many other states held the view that the 
rights of the coastal States and EEZ are limited to the exploitation of liv-
ing and non-living resources and that the water column should be treated 
much like the high seas.85 
 
Ambassador Koh went on to state, “I find a tendency on the part of some 
coastal States . . . to assert their sovereignty in the EEZ . . . [and doing so] 
is not consistent with the intention of those of us who negotiated this text, 
and is not consistent with the correct interpretation of this part [Part V] of 
the Convention.”86 
There are some indications that China may be re-evaluating its position 
as it develops a more robust blue-water capability. There is growing evi-
dence that China has engaged in military activities, to include ISR and mili-
tary marine data collection, in the American, Vietnamese, Philippine and 
Japanese EEZs without notice or consent.87 In its 2013 Annual Report to 
Congress, the Department of Defense indicated that  
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the PLA Navy has begun to conduct military activities within the Exclu-
sive Economic Zones (EEZs) of other nations, without the permission of 
those coastal states. Of note, the United States has observed over the past 
year several instances of Chinese naval activities in the EEZ around 
Guam and Hawaii. One of those instances was during the execution of 
the annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in July/August 2012. 
While the United States considers the PLA Navy activities in its EEZ to 
be lawful, the activity undercuts China’s decades-old position that similar 
foreign military activities in China’s EEZ are unlawful.88 
 
These deployments were confirmed by a PLA officer at the annual Shangri-
La Dialogue in Singapore on June 1, 2013.89  
More recently, in July 2014, a Dongidao-class Auxiliary General Intelli-
gence (AGI) ship was observed in the U.S. EEZ collecting intelligence on 
the USS Ronald Reagan Strike Group during the 2014 Rim of the Pacific 
Exercise (RIMPAC) off the coast of Hawaii.90 Yet, despite evidence that 
the PLAN is conducting ISR operations in foreign EEZs, on August 29, 
2014, China warned the United States to stop its SRO flights near Chinese 
territory, claiming that the surveillance activities undermine China’s security 
interests and could lead to “undesirable incidents.”91 It therefore appears 
that China is applying a double standard. On the one hand, it believes that 
the PLAN can conduct naval operations, including surveillance, in foreign 
EEZs. On the other hand, it objects to the presence of foreign surveillance 
ships and aircraft in China’s EEZ. 
Until 1982, the EEZ did not exist. All waters seaward of the territorial 
sea were considered high seas. For centuries, navies have operated freely in 
these waters “as a matter of right, thereby firmly establishing, as customary 
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international law, the right to conduct military activities beyond the territo-
rial sea.”92 Nothing in UNCLOS changes that paradigm. 
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